When Oscar loses his tail the resulting creature is certainly verso dog

2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians

Is Oscar-minus a dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is a dog? We saw above that one possible response onesto Chrysippus’ paradox was preciso claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not verso dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is per dog, then, given the standard account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. Per fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is per proper part Ricerca profilo friendfinder-x of Oscar – Oscar minus per hair – which is just as much verso dog as Oscar-minus.

There are then at least 101 dogs (and sopra fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply preciso avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar bolla. But the maximality principle may seem sicuro be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark per unison? If verso thing is verso dog, shouldn’t it be court of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested per reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (durante various different ways) from one another and Oscar by per hair, as dogs, and mediante fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is per Dalmatian).

Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still durante place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later to become definitely Dalmatians; some per per day, some durante per second, or verso split second. It seems arbitrary sicuro proclaim verso Dalmatian part that is verso split second away from becoming definitely per Dalmatian, verso Dalmatian, while denying that one per day away is per Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems puro favor one of the latter type according puro which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Sopra any case, the canone account of identity seems unable on its own puro handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.

It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus a hair is per dog – and per Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is per multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark mediante unison no more loudly than Oscar barks macchia.

2.4 The Paradox of Constitution

Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases verso piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into verso statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into verso ball and fashions per new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes a part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using verso new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by a new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Per natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical puro \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical puro \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical to \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical onesto) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical preciso \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By verso similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical preciso both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the norma account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants con quantified modal logic are onesto be handled exactly as they are mediante first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced sicuro affirm that distinct physical objects e time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The standard account is thus davanti facie incompatible with the natural pensiero that constitution is identity.